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Abstract
In an industry where firms compete via supply functions, the set of equilibrium outcomes is
large. If decreasing supply functions are ruled out, this set is reduced significantly, but remains
large. Specifically, the set of prices that can be sustained by supply function equilibria is the
interval between the competitive price and the Cournot price. In sharp contrast, when
the number of firms is above a threshold we identify (e.g., three if demand is linear), only the
Cournot outcome can be sustained by a coalition-proof supply function equilibrium.
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1. Introduction
We study an oligopoly where firms compete via supply functions. In this setting,
each firm chooses a supply function. The supply functions of all firms are then
aggregated to form the market supply which, together with the market demand,
determine the market clearing price and the production of each firm. This model of
competition describes many markets more realistically than the Cournot or the
Bertrand models. In markets for government procurement contracts, or in the
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recently deregulated electricity markets, for example, that the strategies of the firms
are supply functions is a feature of the institutional setting.
A shortcoming of this model is that the set of outcomes that can be sustained by
supply function equilibria (SFE henceforth) is very large see, e.g., Grossman [7],
Hart [8]. Klemperer and Meyer [10] have studied the consequences of introducing
demand uncertainty into the model, and have shown that if uncertainty is
unbounded there is a unique equilibrium. Unfortunately, in many markets demand
uncertainty plays a small role.
We study a version of the model where the strategies of the firms are restricted to
non decreasing supply functions. This restriction seems reasonable and may add
realism to the model: in many markets firms may not be able to commit to a
decreasing supply schedule; in others, decreasing supply functions are explicitly ruled
out by design. It turns out that restricting the strategy spaces significantly reduces the
set of equilibria the monopoly price, for example, can no longer be sustained by
SFE. Nevertheless, the set of equilibrium outcomes remains large. Specifically, the
set of prices that can be sustained by SFE is the interval between the competitive
price and the Cournot price. Further, the prices in this interval can be sustained by
SFE leading to symmetric outcomes as well as by SFE leading to asymmetric ones.
(The Cournot price is the unique exception: every SFE leading to this price yields the
Cournot outcome.)
Next, we consider a setting where firms can communicate prior to taking an
action, but cannot make binding commitments, and we study whether accounting for
the opportunities of coordinated action that communication brings about provides a
basis for determining which outcomes may arise. In non cooperative environments
where players can communicate, equilibria are not viable unless they are
invulnerable to improving deviations by any coalition of players. In other words,
viable equilibria must be ‘‘coalition proof ’’. A number of papers in the literature
have studied which equilibria are coalition proof in a variety of oligopolistic
environments under either Bertrand or Cournot competition see, e.g., [4,13]. We
study the set of outcomes that can be sustained by coalition proof equilibria in our
framework, and we find that the multiplicity of equilibrium outcomes disappears.
We introduce the notion of coalition proof supply function equilibrium (CPSFE
henceforth), which is just an adaptation to our framework of Bernheim et al. [3]
notion of coalition proof Nash equilibrium. A CPSFE is a profile of supply
functions that is invulnerable to improving and self enforcing deviations by any
coalition of firms. A deviation is self enforcing if there is no further self enforcing
improving deviation available to a proper subcoalition of the deviating coalition.
Note that deviations which are not self enforcing are meaningless as they are
vulnerable to further self enforcing improving deviations by proper subcoalitions.
(Aumann [1] introduced an alternative notion of coalition proof equilibrium, strong
Nash equilibrium, which requires that a strategy profile be invulnerable to all
improving coalitional deviations, self enforcing or not. This notion of equilibrium is
so strong, however, that many games have no such equilibria.)
Since there are games for which a coalition proof Nash equilibrium does not exist
(see [3]), we begin by studying whether the existence of a CPSFE is guaranteed in our
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framework. Indeed, we show that the Cournot outcome can be sustained by a
CPSFE, and hence that in our framework a CPSFE always exists. Further, we
identify conditions on the curvature of the demand and cost functions that guarantee
that if the number of firms is above a threshold, the Cournot outcome is the unique
CPSFE outcome. (If the market demand is a linear function, this result arises when
there are three or more firms in the industry.)
Our proofs of unicity of a CPSFE outcome are based purely on Pareto dominance
arguments: It turns out that when the number of firms in the industry is above a
threshold, the Cournot outcome is Pareto superior to every other SFE outcome; i.e.,
the profits of every firm at the Cournot outcome are greater than at every other SFE
outcome. Thus, since the Cournot outcome can be sustained by a CPSFE, every SFE
leading to an outcome other than the Cournot outcome is upset by a self enforcing
deviation of the grand coalition leading to the Cournot outcome.
In proving that the Cournot outcome is Pareto superior to every other SFE outcome,
the class of SFE in which all but perhaps one firm supply inelastically the same fixed
amount, and the remaining firm maximizes on the residual demand, plays an important
role. (The set of outcomes sustained by SFE in this class can be easily characterized.) We
show that for every SFE, there is a SFE in this class such that the profits (and outputs)
of the firms using an inelastic supply function are greater or equal to those of the firm
with the greatest profit (and output) in the original SFE. (This result indirectly
establishes that SFE outcomes cannot be very asymmetric.) It turns out that if the
number of firms is above a threshold, then the Cournot outcome (which can be
sustained by a SFE in this class) is Pareto superior to every other outcome sustained by
SFE in this class, and is therefore Pareto superior to every other SFE outcome.
It is worth noting that in the general context of non cooperative games coalition
proof Nash equilibrium outcomes need not be Pareto optimal within the class of
equilibrium outcomes. In our framework, however, the unique CPSFE outcome (i.e.,
the Cournot outcome) is the unique Pareto optimal outcome within the class of SFE
outcomes. As a consequence, every SFE that leads to an outcome other than the
Cournot outcome is vulnerable to a self enforcing deviation of the grand coalition,
and is therefore very ‘‘unstable.’’ This provides additional support for the Cournot
outcome, since every SFE that leads to a different outcome is easily upset.
An interesting interpretation of our unicity result, parallel to Kreps and Scheinkman
[11], is that the Cournot model provides a ‘‘reduced form’’ of a ‘‘structural model’’
where firms compete by choosing a supply function, but can communicate prior to
taking an action. As we show, when the coordination opportunities brought about by
the possibility of communication are taken into account, the Cournot model yields
predictions identical to those obtained using the more cumbersome model of
competition via supply functions. (See also [9] on this debate.)
2. Supply function equilibria
In this section we describe the model of competition via supply functions, we
characterize the prices that can be sustained by supply function equilibria, and we
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show that every SFE leading to the Cournot price yields the Cournot outcome.
Further, we show that within the set of SFE outcomes the profit of the industry is
uniquely maximized at the Cournot outcome.
The description of the industry, except for allowing more than two firms, is
identical to that of Klemperer and Meyer [10], and is common in the literature see,
e.g., [4,6,11]. As in these papers, we assume that the demand function is concave and
the cost function is convex. Also we assume, as in [10], that firms’ supply functions
are continuously differentiable.
These assumptions render tractable a complex model. (Note that since strategies
are functions, the analysis of the game describing the industry is difficult.)
Specifically, under these assumptions equilibrium outcomes are solutions to the
system of equations formed by first order conditions for profit maximization and the
market clearing condition. (In a SFE every firm maximizes profits on the ‘‘residual’’
demand, effectively determining the market clearing price. Thus, if every firm
chooses a convex supply function, then under the above assumptions the profit of
each firm is a concave and differentiable function of the market price.) Of course,
these assumptions also simplify the analysis; they imply, for example, that the
Cournot equilibrium is unique and symmetric, and that the profit of the industry
increases with prices below the monopoly price. These results hold, however, under
weaker assumptions.
In contrast to Klemperer and Meyer [10], we restrict the supply functions that
firms can use to be non decreasing. This restriction is appropriate for the analysis of
industries where firms cannot commit to a decreasing supply schedule, or to those
where decreasing supply functions are ruled out by design, as in many organized
markets. In the Spanish electricity market, for example, decreasing supply functions
are explicitly ruled out see [5, 4.3.1 Simple Bids, p. 9, 4.6.1.6 Verification of the
Contents of Simple Bids, p. 14]. It turns out that restricting supply functions to be
non decreasing significantly reduces the set of prices that can be sustained by SFE.
The monopoly price, in particular, can no longer be sustained by SFE the largest
price that can be sustained by SFE is the Cournot price.
As in the papers mentioned above, symmetry plays an important role in the
analysis. It seems, however, that appropriate versions of Proposition 2.1 and
Theorem 2.2 hold for asymmetric industries, although the proofs will be
considerably more cumbersome.
2.1. The industry
Demand is known to all firms with certainty. Throughout it is assumed that the
demand function D :Rþ-Rþ is twice continuously differentiable, strictly decreas
ing, and concave on ð0; rÞ; where r40 satisfies DðpÞ40 for por; and DðpÞ ¼ 0 for
pXr: All firms have access to the same technology, and therefore have identical cost
function, C :R-R; we assume that C is twice continuously differentiable, non
decreasing and convex on Rþ; and satisfies C0ð0Þor; and CðqÞ ¼ Cð0Þ for qo0:
(Extending the domain of the cost function to include negative quantities is
inconsequential and simplifies our analysis.)
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An industry is therefore described by a triple ðD; C; NÞ; indicating the market
demand, D; the cost function, C; and the set of firms, N ¼ f1;y; ng where nX2: In
what follows, let us be given an industry ðD; C; NÞ:
2.2. Competition via supply functions
Firms compete by simultaneously choosing a supply function, i.e., a non
decreasing real valued function on ½0; r
 that is continuously differentiable on
ð0; rÞ: For a profile of supply functions s ¼ ðs1;y; snÞ; a market clearing price is a
solution to the equation
Xn
i 1
siðpÞ ¼ DðpÞ: ðMCÞ
Since the market demand is strictly decreasing and the supply function of each firm is
non decreasing, if a market clearing price exists, then it is unique. For each profile of
supply functions s; let pðsÞ be the market clearing price if it exists, and let pðsÞ be zero
if a market clearing price does not exist. The profit (payoff) of a firm iAN is given by
piðsÞ ¼ pðsÞsiðpðsÞÞ CðsiðpðsÞÞÞ: (This construction implicitly assumes that when a
market clearing price does not exist the revenue of every firm is zero.)
A supply function equilibrium (SFE) is a (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium of the
game described. Write SFEðD; C; NÞ for the set of supply function equilibria. In a
SFE each firm maximizes profits on its ‘‘residual demand’’; that is, if
sˆASFEðD; C; NÞ; then pðsˆÞ ¼ pˆ solves
max
pA½0;r

p DðpÞ
X
jai
sˆjðpÞ
 !
C DðpÞ
X
jai
sˆjðpÞ
 !
;
for each iAN: If pˆAð0; rÞ; then sˆ satisfies
DðpˆÞ
X
jai
sˆjðpˆÞ þ D0ðpˆÞ
X
jai
sˆ0jðpˆÞ
 !
pˆ C0 DðpˆÞ
X
jai
sˆjðpˆÞ
 ! !
¼ 0;
for each iAN: Writing qˆi ¼ sˆiðpˆÞ; and using the market clearing condition (MC), this
condition can be written for each iAN as
qˆi þ D0ðpˆÞ
X
jai
sˆ0jðpˆÞ
 !
ðpˆ C0ðqˆiÞÞ ¼ 0: ðEiÞ
Because the demand function is concave and the cost function is convex, if in
addition each sˆi is a convex function, then satisfying the system of equations formed
by ðE1Þ;y; ðEnÞ and (MC) is a sufficient condition for a strategy profile sˆ to be a
SFE. Thus, every equilibrium outcome ðp; q1;y; qnÞ such that 0opor must be a
solution to the system of equations formed by ðE1Þ;y; ðEnÞ; and (MC), for some
profile of supply functions s: For sASFEðD; C; NÞ; we denote by
ðpðsÞ; q1ðsÞ;y; qnðsÞÞ the associated equilibrium outcome.
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2.3. Competitive and Cournot prices
In determining the market prices that can be sustained by SFE the competitive
price and the Cournot price play an important role. In our framework each of these
prices is a solution to a system of equations.
A Cournot outcome ð %p; %q1;y; %qnÞ is characterized by the system of equations
%qi þ ð %p C0ð %qiÞÞD0ð %pÞ ¼ 0; ð %C1Þ
for iAN; andXn
i 1
%qi ¼ Dð %pÞ: ð %C2Þ
Eq. ð %C1Þ ensures that the output of each firm maximizes its profits given the
aggregate output of its rivals, whereas ð %C2Þ ensures that the market clears.
Our assumptions on demand and cost functions imply the existence of a unique
Cournot outcome, which is symmetric (i.e., satisfies %q1 ¼? ¼ %qnÞ: (The Cournot
equilibrium is unique and symmetric under much weaker assumptions on the
curvature of demand and cost functions; see, e.g., [2].) Given an industry ðD; C; NÞ;
we denote by %pðD; C; NÞ and %qðD; C; NÞ the market price and the output of each
firm, respectively, at the Cournot outcome.
A competitive equilibrium ð
%
p;
%
q
1
;y;
%
q
n
Þ satisfies the system of equations
C0ð
%
q
i
Þ ¼
%
p; ð
%
C1Þ
for iAN; andXn
i 1 %
q
i
¼ Dð
%
pÞ: ð
%
C2Þ
Our assumptions on demand and cost functions imply the existence of a unique
competitive price, which we denote by
%
pðD; C; NÞ: Clearly
0p
%
pðD; C; NÞo %pðD; C; NÞor:
2.4. Results
Proposition 2.1 shows that if s is a SFE that leads to the Cournot price, then the
outcome associated with s is the Cournot outcome. Moreover, in every SFE that
sustains the Cournot outcome, the derivative of the supply function of every firm
vanishes at the Cournot price.
Proposition 2.1. Let ðD; C; NÞ be an industry, and let sASFEðD; C; NÞ: If pðsÞ ¼
%pðD; C; NÞ; then sið %pÞ ¼ %qðD; C; NÞ; and s0ið %pÞ ¼ 0 for iAN:
Proof. Let sASFEðD; C; NÞ be such that pðsÞ ¼ %pðD; C; NÞ ¼ %p: Since %pAð0; rÞ; s
satisfies condition ðEiÞ for iAN: We show that sið %pÞ ¼ %qðD; C; NÞ ¼ %q for iAN:
Assume by way of contradiction that there is a firm j such that sjð %pÞa %q: Since
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Pn
i 1 sið %pÞ ¼ Dð %pÞ ¼ n %q; assume without loss of generality that sjð %pÞ ¼ qjo %q: Then,
because D is decreasing, C is convex, and each si is non decreasing, we have
0 ¼ %q þ ð %p C0ð %qÞÞD0ð %pÞ4qj þ ð %p C0ðqjÞÞD0ð %pÞ
Xqj þ ð %p C0ðqjÞÞ D0ð %pÞ
X
iaj
s0ið %pÞ
 !
:
Thus, condition ðEjÞ is not satisfied, which is a contradiction.
We show that s0ið %pÞ ¼ 0 for iAN: For iAN and jAN\i; ðEjÞ and ð %C1Þ imply
0 ¼ %q þ D0ð %pÞð %p C0ð %qÞÞ ¼ %q þ D0ð %pÞ
X
kaj
sˆ0kð %pÞ
 !
ð %p C0ð %qÞÞ:
Therefore
P
kaj s
0
kð %pÞ ¼ 0; and since s0kX0 for kaj; we have s0ið %pÞ ¼ 0: &
Note that concavity of demand plays no role in the proof of Proposition 2.1.
Next, we study the set of outcomes that can be sustained by SFE. Klemperer and
Meyer [10] have shown that when supply functions are not restricted to be non
decreasing, then every outcome ðp; q1;y; qnÞARnþ such that DðpÞ ¼
Pn
i 1 qi and
C0ðqiÞop for each iAN can be sustained by a SFE; in particular, the monopoly price
can be sustained by SFE. Restricting supply functions to be non decreasing
significantly reduces this set; in particular, the monopoly price can no longer be
sustained as a SFE.
Write SFEpðD; C; NÞ for the set of prices that can be sustained by SFE, i.e.,
pASFEpðD; C; NÞ if p ¼ pðsÞ for some sASFEðD; C; NÞ: Theorem 2.2 establishes
that SFEpðD; C; NÞ is the half open interval containing the prices between the
competitive price and the Cournot price.
Theorem 2.2. SFEpðD; C; NÞ ¼ ð
%
pðD; C; NÞ; %pðD; C; NÞ
:
Proof. Write
%
pðD; C; NÞ ¼
%
p and %pðD; C; NÞ ¼ %p: Let pˆAð
%
p; %p
; we show that there is
sˆASFEðD; C; NÞ such that pðsˆÞ ¼ pˆ: Write qˆ ¼ DðpˆÞ
n
; and for iAN let sˆiðpÞ ¼ aˆ þ #ap;
where aˆ and #a satisfy
aˆ þ #apˆ ¼ qˆ ð2:1Þ
and
qˆ þ ðpˆ C0ðqˆÞÞðD0ðpˆÞ ðn 1Þ#aÞ ¼ 0: ð2:2Þ
Note that sˆ0iðpÞ ¼ #a for iAN: We show that #aX0; and therefore that each sˆi is non
decreasing. Since pˆp %p and D is decreasing we have qˆX %q; and since D concave and C
is convex we have
qˆ þ ðpˆ C0ðqˆÞÞD0ðpˆÞX %q þ ð %p C0ð %qÞÞD0ð %pÞ ¼ 0;
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and therefore
#a ¼ 1
n 1
D0ðpˆÞ þ qˆ
pˆ C0ðqˆÞ
 
X0:
Eq. (2.1) and the definition of qˆ guarantee that pˆ is the market clearing price for
sˆ ¼ ðsˆ1;y; sˆnÞ: Eq. (2.2) ensures that sˆ satisfies Ei for iAN: Since each sˆi is convex,
we have sˆASFEðD; C; NÞ:
Let sˆ be such that pðsˆÞ ¼ pˆp
%
por: We show that sˆeSFEðD; C; NÞ: Since D is
decreasing, we have DðpˆÞXDð
%
pÞ4DðrÞ ¼ 0; hence there is one firm iAN producing
sˆiðpˆÞ ¼ qˆiXDðpÞn 40; and since C is convex, ð %C1Þ implies that C
0ðqˆiÞXC0ðDðpÞn Þ ¼
%
pXpˆ:
Since s0jðpˆÞX0 for jAN; and D is decreasing we have
qˆi þ D0ðpˆÞ
X
jai
sˆ0jðpˆÞ
 !
ðpˆ C0ðqˆiÞÞ40:
Thus, condition ðEiÞ is not satisfied. Moreover, if pˆ ¼ 0 then we have piðsˆÞ ¼
CðqˆiÞo Cð0Þ: Hence sˆeSFEðD; C; NÞ:
Finally, let sˆ be such that pˆ4 %p40: We show that sˆeSFEðD; C; NÞ: Since D is
strictly decreasing, we have DðpˆÞoDð %pÞ: Consequently, at least one firm iAN is
producing sˆiðpˆÞ ¼ qˆio %q ¼ %qðD; C; NÞ: Thus, since sˆ0iðpˆÞX0; for iAN; and
D0ðpˆÞpD0ð %pÞ (recall that D is concave), ð %C1Þ implies
0 ¼ %q þ D0ð %pÞð %p C0ð %qÞÞ4qˆi þ D0ðpˆÞ
X
jai
sˆ0jðpˆÞ
 !
ðpˆ C0ðqˆiÞÞ:
Hence condition ðEiÞ is not satisfied, and therefore sˆeSFEðD; C; NÞ: &
Note that both concavity of demand and convexity of cost are used throughout
the proof of Theorem 2.2. Also note that the construction in the proof of Theorem
2.2 establishes that every price between the competitive price and the Cournot price
can be sustained by a symmetric SFE, whose associated outcome is therefore
symmetric (i.e., all firms produce the same quantity). Nevertheless, there are
asymmetric outcomes that can be sustained by SFE (see Example 3.6). It is also
interesting to observe that in the SFE constructed in the proof of the Theorem 2.2,
the parameter #a ranges from zero for pˆ ¼ %p; to infinity as pˆ approaches
%
p (because
pˆ C0ðqˆÞ approaches zero).
The following remark is a direct implication of Theorem 2.2.
Remark 2.3. For each sASFEðD; C; NÞ; we have pðsÞAð0; rÞ: Hence every SFE
outcome is a solution to the system of equations ðE1Þ;y; ðEnÞ; (MC), for some
profile s of supply functions.
We finish this section by showing in Proposition 2.4 that within the set of
outcomes that can be sustained by SFE, the profit of the industry is uniquely
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maximized at the Cournot outcome. This result plays an important role in
establishing in Section 3 that the Cournot outcome can be sustained by a CPSFE.
Proposition 2.4. Let ðD; C; NÞ be an industry, and let %s; sˆASFEðD; C; NÞ be such that
pð%sÞ ¼ %pðD; C; NÞapðsˆÞ:Then Pni 1 pið%sÞ4Pni 1 piðsˆÞ:
Proof. Write %pðD; C; NÞ ¼ %p; and for pAð0; rÞ; define
PðpÞ ¼ pDðpÞ nC DðpÞ
n
 
:
Since P is concave (because D and C are concave), and
P0ð %pÞ ¼Dð %pÞ þ D0ð %pÞ %p C0 Dð %pÞ
n
  
¼Dð %pÞ Dð %pÞ
n
¼ ðn 1ÞDð %pÞ
n
40;
we have P0ðpÞ40 for 0opp %p: Therefore Pð %pÞ4PðpÞ for 0opo %p:
Let %s; sˆASFEðD; C; NÞ be such that pð%sÞ ¼ %papˆ ¼ pðsˆÞ: Then %p4pˆ by Theorem
2.2. Further, qið%sÞ ¼ %qðD; C; NÞ ¼ DðpÞn by Proposition 2.1, and since C is convex, we
have
Xn
i 1
pið%sÞ ¼ Pð %pÞ4PðpˆÞX
Xn
i 1
ðpˆqiðsˆÞ CðqiðsˆÞÞÞ ¼
Xn
i 1
piðsˆÞ;
which establishes Proposition 2.4. &
The following remark, which a direct implication of Proposition 2.4, establishes
that the Cournot outcome is not Pareto dominated by any other SFE outcome.
Remark 2.5. Let ðD; C; NÞ be an industry, and let %sASFEðD; C; NÞ be such that
pð%sÞ ¼ %pðD; C; NÞ: Then there is no s˜ASFEðD; C; NÞ satisfying piðs˜Þ4pið%sÞ for all
iAN:
3. Coalition-proof supply function equilibria
In this section we introduce the notion of coalition proof supply function
equilibrium (CPSFE), and show that in our framework a CPSFE exists. Further,
under appropriate conditions there is a unique CPSFE outcome. Remarkably, this
outcome is the Cournot outcome. In both existence and uniqueness of CPSFE
outcomes, restricting the supply functions of firms to be non decreasing plays an
essential role. We comment on this issue below. We also discuss in Section 3.4 the
robustness of the uniqueness result to cost asymmetries.
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3.1. The notion of CPSFE
In environments where players can freely discuss their strategies but cannot make
binding commitments, viable agreements must be invulnerable to improving
deviations by either individual players or coalitions of players. Thus, in these
environments it is natural to ask which equilibria are ‘‘coalition proof.’’ Indeed, this
question has been studied in a variety of contexts, including political economy, social
choice, and industrial organization e.g., Bernheim and Whinston [4], and Yi [13]
study this issue in a variety of oligopolistic environments.
Several alternative notions of coalition proof equilibrium have been proposed in
the literature. Aumann [1] introduced the notion of strong Nash equilibrium, which
requires that a strategy profile be invulnerable to all improving coalitional
deviations. The notion of strong Nash equilibrium is often too strong. Many games
fail to have equilibria of this kind: in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game, for example, the
unique Nash equilibrium is not strong because it is vulnerable to the deviation where
both players choose the cooperative action; note, however, that this deviation is
meaningless as it is itself vulnerable to a further improving deviation by either player.
We formalize the notion of coalition proof supply function equilibrium (CPSFE
henceforth), which is just an adaptation to our framework of the notion of coalition
proof Nash equilibrium introduced by Bernheim et al. [3]. A CPSFE is a profile of
supply functions that is invulnerable to improving and self enforcing deviations by
any coalition of firms. A deviation is self enforcing if there is no further self
enforcing improving deviation available to a proper subcoalition of the deviating
coalition. Thus, following Bernheim et al. [3] we do not require that a profile of
supply functions be invulnerable to all deviations, but just to those that are
invulnerable to further self enforcing deviations by proper subcoalitions. We begin
by formally defining the notion of CPSFE.
Let ðD; C; NÞ be an industry. We denote by 2N the set of all possible coalitions.
For a strategy profile s and a coalition MA2N ; write sM for the profile of supply
functions of the members of M; and write m for the cardinality of the set M: Let s be
a strategy profile and let MA2N ; 2pmon; be a coalition of firms (recall that nX2).
Holding fixed the strategies of the members of the complementary coalition, sN\M ;
the situation the group of firms in M faces can be modeled as that of an ‘‘industry’’
ðDs;M ; C; MÞ; where Ds;M is given for pARþ by
Ds;MðpÞ ¼
DðpÞ P
iAN\M
siðpÞ if DðpÞ
P
iAN\M
siðpÞX0;
0 otherwise:
8<
:
This recursive structure allows us to formalize the notion of CPSFE.
Coalition proof supply function equilibrium: Let ðD; C; NÞ be an industry.
(1) If n ¼ 2; a strategy profile s is a coalition proof supply function equilibrium if
sASFEðD; C; NÞ and there is no s˜ASFEðD; C; NÞ satisfying piðs˜Þ4piðsÞ for every
iAN:
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(2) Let n42 and assume that the notion of coalition proof supply function
equilibrium has been defined for industries with fewer than n firms.
(i) A strategy profile s is self enforcing if sASFEðD; C; NÞ; and if for all MA2N ;
2pmon; sM is a coalition proof supply function equilibrium of the industry
ðDs;M ; C; MÞ:
(ii) A strategy profile s is a coalition proof supply function equilibrium if it is self
enforcing and if there is no self enforcing strategy profile s˜ such that piðs˜Þ4piðsÞ for
every iAN:
The definition of CPSFE applies to industries with no fewer than two firms. Note
that a CPSFE is a SFE, and therefore it is invulnerable to deviations by a single firm.
Given an industry ðD; C; NÞ; write CPSFEðD; C; NÞ for the set of supply function
equilibria.
3.2. Existence of CPSFE
Since there are no general results on the existence of coalition proof Nash
equilibrium, we begin by establishing in Theorem 3.1 that every industry has a
CPSFE. (Moreno and Wooders [12] provide conditions on the set of iteratively
undominated strategies that guarantee existence of a coalition proof Nash
equilibrium. In our framework, iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies
will not take us very far.)
Theorem 3.1. Every industry has a coalition proof supply function equilibrium.
Theorem 3.1 is a direct implication of Proposition 3.2 below, which establishes
that the Cournot outcome can be sustained by a CPSFE. The proof of Proposition
3.2 relies on the recursive structure of Cournot equilibrium. The argument of the
proof is analogous to that used by Bernheim and Whinston [4] to establish that in an
industry (as the one described here) where firms compete a` la Cournot, the unique
equilibrium is a coalition proof Nash equilibrium. Since in our context we have
multiplicity of equilibria, our proof relies on the fact that the Cournot outcome is on
the Pareto frontier of the set of SFE outcomes (see Remark 2.5). Thus, restricting the
supply functions of firms to be non decreasing plays an essential role in this
argument. Indeed, if this restriction is removed, then the monopoly outcome where
firms share the market equally arises as a SFE outcome see [10] and therefore the
Cournot outcome is no longer on the Pareto frontier of the set of SFE outcomes.
Proposition 3.2. The Cournot outcome can be sustained by a CPSFE. Moreover, every
SFE that yields the Cournot outcome is a CPSFE.
Proof. Let ðD; C; NÞ be an industry, and let sASFEðD; C; NÞ be such that pðsÞ ¼
%pðD; C; NÞ ¼ %p and qiðsÞ ¼ %qðD; C; NÞ ¼ %q for iAN: (The existence of a SFE leading
to the Cournot outcome is guaranteed by Theorem 2.2 and Proposition 2.1.) We
show by induction on the number of firms that sACPSFEðD; C; NÞ:
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If n ¼ 2; then sACPSFEðD; C; NÞ follows from Remark 2.5. Let n42; and assume
that sACPSFEðD; C; KÞ whenever 2pkon: We show that sACPSFEðD; C; NÞ:
Note that for MA2N such that 2pmok the Cournot outcome of the industry
ðDs;M ; C; MÞ is also ð %p; %q;y; %qÞ; hence the induction hypothesis implies
sMACPSFEðDs;M ; C; MÞ: Since sASFEðD; C; NÞ; s is self enforcing. Moreover,
since any other self enforcing strategy s˜ is a member of SFEðD; C; NÞ;
sACPSFEðD; C; NÞ follows from Remark 2.5. &
3.3. Uniqueness of CPSFE outcomes
Next, we establish conditions under which the Cournot outcome is the unique
CPSFE outcome. We show that when the number of firms in the industry is above a
threshold, the Cournot outcome is Pareto superior to every other SFE outcome (i.e.,
the profits of every firm at the Cournot outcome are greater than at every other SFE
outcome). Thus, any CPSFE leading to the Cournot outcome, which exist by
Proposition 3.2, is a self enforcing and improving deviation of the grand coalition to
every SFE leading to an outcome other than the Cournot outcome. Hence the
Cournot outcome is the unique CPSFE outcome.
In proving that the Cournot outcome is Pareto superior to every other SFE
outcome, a particular class of SFE plays an important role. In this class all but
perhaps one firm supply inelastically the same fixed amount, and the remaining firm
maximizes on the residual demand. (The Cournot outcome, in particular, can be
sustained by a SFE in this class.) The SFE outcomes in this class are solutions to a
simple system of equations, and can be parametrized by the slope of the supply
function of the firm maximizing on the residual demand, evaluated at the market
clearing price.
We show that for every SFE, sˆ; one can find a SFE in this class, s˜; for which the
profits of the firms using an inelastic supply function (say firms 1 to n 1) are greater
or equal to those obtained by the firm with the greatest profits in the original SFE
(i.e., p1ðs˜Þ ¼? ¼ pn1ðs˜ÞXmaxfp1ðsˆÞ;y; pnðsˆÞg). This key result is established in
Proposition 3.3. As a direct consequence of this result, when the Cournot outcome is
Pareto superior to every other outcome in this class, it is in fact Pareto superior to
every other SFE outcome, and is therefore the unique CPSFE outcome (Proposition
3.4).
Let ðD; C; NÞ be an industry. Consider the outcomes that can be sustained by
sASFEðD; C; NÞ for which there is jAN such that siðpÞ ¼ vARþ for each iAN\f jg
and pA½0; r
: Writing pðsÞ ¼ u; and sjðuÞ ¼ w; we can obtain these outcomes
ðu; v; wÞAR3þ as solutions to a system of equations ðEðaÞÞ given by
w ¼ D0ðuÞðu C0ðwÞÞ; ðEa:1Þ
v ¼ ða D0ðuÞÞðu C0ðvÞÞ; ðEa:2Þ
ðn 1Þv þ w ¼ DðuÞ; ðEa:3Þ
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for aARþ: (In system ðEðaÞÞ; the parameter a is the slope of the supply function of
firm j; the firm using an elastic supply, evaluated at the market clearing price.)
System ðEðaÞÞ implicitly defines a function ðuðaÞ; vðaÞ; wðaÞÞ on ½0;NÞ that is
continuously differentiable on ð0;NÞ: (In the proof of Proposition 3.3, given in the
appendix, we show that fixing the production of a firm with the greatest production
in an arbitrary SFE, vARþ; system ðEðaÞÞ has a unique solution, ðuðvÞ; wðvÞ; aðvÞÞ:
Moreover, a040; and therefore the function a is invertible.) Define the function p on
½0;NÞ by
pðaÞ ¼ uðaÞvðaÞ CðvðaÞÞ:
Note that p is continuously differentiable on ð0;NÞ:
For aX0 denote by SFEaðD; C; NÞ the set of SFE of the form described above.
Every sASFEaðD; C; NÞ leads to an outcome given by pðsÞ ¼ uðaÞ; qiðsÞ ¼ vðaÞ for
iAN\f jg; and qjðsÞ ¼ wðaÞ: The function pðaÞ provides the profits of the firms using
an inelastic supply. Note that for a ¼ 0 system ðEðaÞÞ reduces to Eqs. ð %C1Þ and ð %C2Þ;
and therefore the outcome associated with every sASFE0ðD; C; NÞ is the Cournot
outcome. Hence pð0Þ ¼ %pðD; C; NÞ %qðD; C; NÞ Cð %qðD; C; NÞÞ:
Proposition 3.3 establishes the key result mentioned above. Its proof involves
tedious calculations, and it is relegated to the appendix. In the proof we use the
assumption that the cost function is thrice continuously differentiable and that its
third derivative is non negative. As shown in the proof, an implication of this
assumption is that SFE are not ‘‘very asymmetric’’, a condition that guarantees the
existence of an equilibrium in the class described above that satisfies certain
properties. This assumption is also needed in Proposition 3.4 (whose proof appeals
to Proposition 3.3), and is satisfied under the conditions imposed in Theorems 3.5
and 3.7 (which proofs appeal to Proposition 3.4).
Proposition 3.3. Let ðD; C; NÞ be an industry such that C is thrice continuously
differentiable and satisfies C000ðqÞX0 for q40: If sˆASFEðD; C; NÞ is such that
pðsˆÞa %pðD; C; NÞ; then there is a40 satisfying pðaÞXmaxfp1ðsˆÞ;y; pnðsˆÞg:
Proposition 3.4 establishes that if the function p of an industry ðD; C; NÞ reaches a
maximum at a ¼ 0; then the Cournot outcome is the unique CPSFE outcome. This
fact is a straightforward implication of Propositions 3.2 and 3.3.
Proposition 3.4. Let ðD; C; NÞ be an industry such that C is thrice continuously
differentiable and satisfies C000ðqÞX0 for q40: If pð0Þ4pðaÞ for all aAð0;NÞ; then
ðpðsÞ; q1ðsÞ;y; qnðsÞÞ ¼ ð %pðD; C; NÞ; %qðD; C; NÞ;y; %qðD; C; NÞÞ
for all sACPSFEðD; C; NÞ:
Proof. Denote %pðD; C; NÞ ¼ %p and %qðD; C; NÞ ¼ %q: Let sASFEðD; C; NÞ be such
that ðpðsÞ; q1ðsÞ;y; qnðsÞÞað %p; %q;y; %qÞ: We show that seCPSFEðD; C; NÞ:
Proposition 2.1 implies pðsÞa %p; hence by Proposition 3.3 there is a40 satisfying
pðaÞXmaxfp1ðsÞ;y; pnðsÞg: Let %sACPSFEðD; C; NÞ be such that pð%sÞ ¼ %p and
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qið%sÞ ¼ %q for iAN: (The existence of %s is guaranteed by Proposition 3.2.) Then we
have
pið%sÞ ¼ pð0Þ4pðaÞXmaxfp1ðsÞ;y; pnðsÞgXpiðsÞ;
for all iAN: Moreover, since %sACPSFEðD; C; NÞ; %s is self enforcing. Hence
seCPSFEðD; C; NÞ: &
Next, we establish conditions under which in a linear industry the assumptions of
Proposition 3.4 hold. A linear industry is described by a linear demand function,
(i.e., DðpÞ ¼ a bp; for pA½0; a
b

; where a; bARþ), and a linear cost function (i.e.,
CðqÞ ¼ cq; for qX0; where cARþ). Our assumption that C0ð0Þor amounts to
assuming coa
b
: Thus, a linear industry is described by the parameters a; b; c; and n:
Theorem 3.5 establishes that if there are three or more firms in a linear industry the
Cournot outcome is the unique CPSFE outcome. We obtain this result by directly
calculating the function p; and appealing to Proposition 3.4.
Theorem 3.5. Let ðD; C; NÞ be a linear industry. If nX3; then
ðpðsÞ; q1ðsÞ;y; qnðsÞÞ ¼ ð %pðD; C; NÞ; %qðD; C; NÞ;y; %qðD; C; NÞÞ
for all sACPSFEðD; C; NÞ:
Proof. Let ðD; C; NÞ be a linear industry such that nX3; and let a; b; and c be the
parameters describing the demand and cost functions. The solution to system ðEðaÞÞ
yields
pðaÞ ¼ ðaþ bÞða bcÞ
2
ððn 1Þaþ ðn þ 1ÞbÞ2:
Hence p0ðaÞo0 on ð0;NÞ; and therefore pð0Þ4pðaÞ for aAð0;NÞ: Thus, the
conclusion of Theorem 3.5 follows from Proposition 3.4. &
Note that in an industry where there are only two firms the Stackelberg outcomes
are in the Pareto frontier of the set of SFE outcomes, and are therefore CPSFE
outcomes. By Theorem 3.5, however, in a linear industry the presence of three or
more firms reduces the set of CPSFE outcomes to just the Cournot outcome.
Theorem 3.7 below establishes that in fact this conclusion extends to every industry
ðD; C; NÞ with a quadratic cost function and linear demand. Nevertheless, as
Example 3.6 shows, there are industries with three firms for which outcomes other
than the Cournot outcome can be sustained by CPSFE.
Example 3.6. Consider the industry where DðpÞ ¼ 1 p2 for pA½0; 1
; CðqÞ ¼ 0 for
qAR; and N ¼ f1; 2; 3g: From the solution to system ðEðaÞÞ one can compute the
function p to obtain
pðaÞ ¼ 1
49
ð ða2 þ 7Þ
q
aÞ 2þ 3a
7
ð ða2 þ 7Þ
q
aÞ
 
:
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This function is uniquely maximized at a ¼ 13: Let sASFE1
3
ðD; C; NÞ: In this SFE,
two of the firms produce 1
3
and the remaining firm produces 2
9
: We show
sACPSFEðD; C; NÞ: Since pð1
3
ÞXpðaÞ for aX0; by Proposition 3.3 s is Pareto
superior to every other SFE outcome. Hence the coalition of all three firms does not
have a self enforcing and improving deviation. In addition, the two firms producing 1
3
are in fact at the Cournot outcome of the ‘‘residual industry’’ (fixing the production
of the remaining firm to be 2
9
), and therefore by Proposition 3.2 this coalition does
not have an improving self enforcing deviation either. Nor does a coalition formed
by a firm producing 1
3
and the firm producing 2
9
have an improving self enforcing
deviation, since these productions correspond to a Stackelberg outcome of their
residual industry. Hence s is a CPSFE.
Let D and C be the demand and cost functions of an industry. Denote by n the
smallest integer such that
nX2þ D
0ð %pÞ þ D00ð %pÞð %p C0ð %qÞÞ
D0ð %pÞð1 D0ð %pÞC00ð %qÞÞ :
Under appropriate conditions on the functions D and C; n provides a threshold for
the number of firms which guarantees that if nXn; then the Cournot outcome is the
unique outcome that can be sustained by a CPSFE. Note that under our
assumptions of demand and cost n42: Further, if demand is linear, then n ¼ 3:
Also note that for the industry in Example 3.6 we have
n ¼ 2þ 2 %p þ 2 %p
2 %p
¼ 4:
Indeed, in this industry pð0Þ4pðaÞ for a40 whenever there are four or more firms
(and therefore by Proposition 3.4 the Cournot outcome is the unique outcome that
can be sustained by a CPSFE).
Theorem 3.7 establishes more general conditions than those of Theorem 3.5 under
which the Cournot outcome is the unique CPSFE outcome.
Theorem 3.7. Let ðD; C; NÞ be an industry. If
(1) C00ðqÞ ¼ 0 for q40; D000ðpÞp0 for pAð0; rÞ; and nXn; or
(2) C000ðqÞ ¼ 0 for q40; D00ðpÞ ¼ 0 for pAð0; rÞ; and nX3 ¼ n;
then
ðpðsÞ; q1ðsÞ;y; qnðsÞÞ ¼ ð %pðD; C; NÞ; %qðD; C; NÞ;y; %qðD; C; NÞÞ
for all sACPSFEðD; C; NÞ:
The following lemma provides alternative conditions that ensure that the function
p has a unique maximum on a ¼ 0: These conditions are useful in the proof of
Theorem 3.7. The proof of this lemma is given in the appendix.
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Lemma 3.8. Let ðD; C; NÞ be an industry. Assume that for each aAð0;NÞ either
(1) nXn and @
2w
@u2
X0; or
(2) ðn 1Þa ðn 2ÞD0ðuÞ @w@u40
Then pð0Þ4pðaÞ for a40:
With these results in hand we can now prove Theorem 3.7.
Proof of Theorem 3.7. We show that under either of the assumptions of Theorem 3.7
condition (1) of Lemma 3.8 is satisfied, and therefore that pð0Þ4pðaÞ for a40: The
conclusion of Theorem 3.7 then follows from Proposition 3.4.
Suppose that (1) of Theorem 3.7 holds. Implicit differentiation of ðEðaÞ:1Þ yields
@w
@u
¼ D0ðuÞ D00ðuÞðu C0ðwÞÞ;
and therefore
@2w
@u2
¼ 2D00ðuÞ D000ðuÞðu C0ðwÞÞX0:
Suppose that (2) of Theorem 3.7 holds. Then again differentiating ðEðaÞ:1Þ we get
@w
@u
¼ D
0ðuÞ
1 C00ðwÞD0ðuÞ;
and therefore
@2w
@u2
¼ 0: &
Checking conditions (1) and (2) of Lemma 3.8 directly allows us to establish that
the Cournot outcome is the unique CPSFE outcome for a quadratic industry
(Example 3.9), and for an industry where the cost function is quadratic and the
demand is a polynomial of third order (Example 3.10). These examples are outside
the scope of Theorem 3.7.
Example 3.9. Consider an industry where DðpÞ ¼ 1 p2 for pA½0; 1
; CðqÞ ¼ 1
2
q2 for
qX0; and N ¼ f1; 2; 3g: For this industry, the Cournot outcome is the unique
outcome that can be sustained by a CPSFE. We show that (1) of Lemma 3.8 holds;
hence that p0ðaÞo0 for a40; and therefore this result follows from Proposition 3.4.
Let a40: From ðEðaÞ:1Þ we have
w ¼ 2uðu wÞ ¼ 2 u
2
1þ 2u:
Hence
@2w
@u2
¼ 4ð1þ 2uÞ340:
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Example 3.10. Consider an industry where DðpÞ ¼ 13ð27 p3Þ; for pA½0; 3
; CðqÞ ¼
1
2
q2 for qX0; and N ¼ f1; 2; 3g: The Cournot outcome for this industry is %p ¼
2:1977; %q ¼ 1:8206: Implicit differentiation of ðEðaÞ:1Þ yields (see the appendix)
@2w
@u2
ð %pÞ ¼ 2 %pð3 %p
2Þ
ð1þ %p2Þ3
o0;
hence (1) of Lemma 3.8 does not hold. Nonetheless, it is easy to prove that (2) of
Theorem 3.7 holds. Write
gðaÞ ¼ 1
n 1
ðn 1Þa ðn 2ÞD0ðuÞ @w
@u
 
¼ 1
2
2a D0ðuÞ @w
@u
 
:
We show gðaÞp0: One can compute gð0Þ (see the appendix) to obtain
gð0Þ ¼ D0ð %pÞðn nÞ:
As
n ¼ 34n ¼ 2þ %p
2 þ 2 %pð %p %qÞ
%p2ð1þ %p2Þ ¼ 2:2304;
we have gð0Þo0: Hence it suffices to show that g0ðaÞo0: We have
g0ðaÞ ¼ ð1 D00ðuÞu0ðaÞÞ þ 1
n 1
D00ðuÞ þ @
2w
@u2
 
u0ðaÞ;
and since u0ðaÞo0; then D00ðuÞ þ @2w
@u2
40 implies g0ðaÞo0: Here we have
D00ðuÞ þ @
2w
@u2
¼ 2u 1þ 3 u
2
ð1þ u2Þ3
 !
40:
3.4. Uniqueness and cost asymmetries
In this section we discuss the robustness of the uniqueness result in the context of a
simple linear asymmetric industry with three firms. We show that if marginal costs
are sufficiently asymmetric there are multiple CPSFE outcomes. We also show that
when firms’ costs are nearly symmetric, the Pareto superiority of the Cournot
outcome is preserved. Hence the result that the Cournot outcome is the unique
CPSFE outcome is robust to cost asymmetries. (Actually, we prove that the Cournot
outcome is Pareto superior to every outcome generated by a SFE in the class
SFEaðD; C1; C2; C3; f1; 2; 3gÞ with a40; described in Section 3.3. Establishing
uniqueness of CPSFE formally requires showing that Proposition 3.3 holds for this
industry if costs are nearly symmetric. The proof of this result is cumbersome, and
we omit it.)
Consider a linear industry where there are three firms whose cost functions are
C1ðqÞ ¼ 0; and C2ðqÞ ¼ C3ðqÞ ¼ cq; with 0pcp13: The demand is given, without loss
of generality, by DðpÞ ¼ 1 p: Consider the SFE equilibrium
sˆASFE1ðD; C1; C2; C3; NÞ; given by sˆ1ðpÞ ¼ qˆ1 ¼ 13 þ c; sˆ2ðpÞ ¼ qˆ2 ¼ 13 c; and sˆ3
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satisfies sˆ3ðpðsˆÞÞ ¼ qˆ3 ¼ 12ð13 cÞ and sˆ03ðpðsˆÞÞ ¼ 1; leading to profits #p1 ¼ 118ð1þ 3cÞ2;
and #p2 ¼ 2 #p3 ¼ 118ð1 3cÞ2: (It is easy to check that ðpˆ; qˆ1; qˆ2; qˆ3; #a), with pˆ ¼
1
6
ð1þ 3cÞ and #a ¼ 1 are a solution to system ðEðaÞÞ; suitably modified for this
industry with cost asymmetries this system includes four rather than three
equations; see below.) This equilibrium can be interpreted as one where firm 3
behaves as a Stackelberg follower, and firms 1 and 2, the leaders, compete a´ la
Cournot.
At the Cournot outcome of this industry, profits are %p1 ¼ 116ð1þ 2cÞ2 and %p2 ¼
%p3 ¼ 116ð1 2cÞ2: Thus, #p1 %p1 ¼ 1144ð12c þ 36c2 1Þ: Hence for some parameter
values, e.g., c ¼ 1
6
; we have #p1 %p140; i.e., the Cournot outcome is not Pareto
superior to the outcome generated by the SFE sˆ described above. Indeed, it is easy to
see that if c ¼ 1
6
the profile sˆ is a CPSFE this can be shown by an argument similar
to that used in Example 3.6 above.
For values of c near zero, however, the Cournot outcome is Pareto superior to the
outcome generated by sˆ (i.e., %pi4 #pi for iAN). Moreover, for values of c near zero the
Cournot outcome is Pareto superior to all the outcomes generated by SFE in the
class SFEaðD; C1; C2; C3; NÞ with a40: To see this, note that in this industry with
cost asymmetries we must consider two types of SFE in the class
SFEaðD; C1; C2; C3; NÞ; namely,
(a) those in which firms 1 and 2 (or 1 and 3) act as leaders, competing a´ la
Cournot, and firm 3 (2) behaves as a follower, and
(b) those where firms 2 and 3 act as leaders, competing a´ la Cournot, and firm 1
behaves as a follower.
For each type of SFE, (a) and (b), by solving the appropriate version of system of
equations ðEðaÞÞ we can calculate the profits of the leaders (as a function of a; the
slope of the followers supply) and c (the marginal cost of firms 1 and 2). For the SFE
of type (a) system ðEaðaÞÞ is
q1 ¼ ð1þ aÞp;
q2 ¼ ð1þ aÞðp cÞ;
q3 ¼ ðp cÞ;
q1 þ q2 þ q3 ¼ 1 p:
At these equilibria the profits of the leaders, say firms 1 and 2, are
pa1ða; cÞ ¼
1
4
ð1þ cð2þ aÞÞ2 1þ að2þ aÞ2
and
pa2ða; cÞ ¼
1
4
ð1 2c þ acÞð1 cð2þ aÞÞ 1þ að2þ aÞ2:
For values of c near zero both these functions are decreasing in a; and therefore the
Cournot outcome is Pareto superior to the outcomes generated by these equilibria.
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For the SFE of type (b), solving system ðEbðaÞÞ we calculate the profits of the
leaders,
pb2ða; cÞ ¼ pb3ða; cÞ ¼
1
4
ð2c 1Þ2 1þ að2þ aÞ2:
Again for values of c near zero this function is decreasing in a; and therefore the
Cournot outcome is Pareto superior to the outcomes generated by these equilibria.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3.3. Let ðD; C; NÞ be an industry such that C 000ðqÞX0 for q40
and let sˆASFEðD; C; NÞ: Write %pðD; C; NÞ ¼ %p; %qðD; C; NÞ ¼ %q; pðsˆÞ ¼ pˆ; and
qiðsˆÞ ¼ qˆi; #ai ¼ sˆ0iðpˆÞ; and Aˆi ¼
P
jAN\fig #aj for iAN: Assume that pˆa %p:
Without loss of generality assume that qˆ1Xqˆ2X?Xqˆn; thus
maxfp1ðsˆÞ;y; pnðsˆÞg ¼ p1ðsˆÞ: First we show that DðpˆÞ ðn 1Þqˆ140: Since
sˆASFEðD; C; NÞ; for iAN we have
qˆi ¼ ðAˆi D0ðpˆÞÞðpˆ C0ðqˆiÞÞ;
by condition ðEiÞ: Hence for iAN we have
qˆi ¼ qˆ1 ðAˆ1 D0ðpˆÞÞðpˆ C0ðqˆ1ÞÞ þ ðAˆi D0ðpˆÞÞðpˆ C0ðqˆiÞÞ
¼ qˆ1 þ ð#a1 #aiÞðpˆ C0ðqˆ1ÞÞ þ ðAˆi D0ðpˆÞÞðC 0ðqˆ1Þ C0ðqˆiÞÞ:
Thus, since pˆ maximizes the profits of firm 1 on the residual demand, we have
pˆXC0ðq1Þ; and therefore
DðpˆÞ ðn 1Þqˆ1 ¼ qˆ1 þ
X
i41
qˆi
 !
ðn 1Þqˆ1
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¼ qˆ1 þ
X
i41
ðð#a1 #aiÞðpˆ C0ðqˆ1ÞÞ
þ ðAˆi D0ðpˆÞÞðC0ðqˆ1Þ C0ðqˆiÞÞÞ
¼ ðAˆ1 D0ðpˆÞ þ ðn 1Þ#a1 Aˆ1Þðpˆ C0ðqˆ1ÞÞ
þ
X
i41
ðAˆi D0ðpˆÞÞðC0ðqˆ1Þ C0ðqˆiÞÞ
¼ ððn 1Þ#a1 D0ðpˆÞÞðpˆ C0ðqˆ1ÞÞ
þ
X
i41
ðAˆi D0ðpˆÞÞðC0ðqˆ1Þ C0ðqˆiÞÞ40:
Let pˇ be such that Dðp˜Þ ðn 1Þqˆ1 ¼ 0; and for uA½pˆ; pˇ
 define
fðuÞ ¼ DðuÞ ðn 1Þqˆ1 þ D0ðuÞðu C0ðDðuÞ ðn 1Þqˆ1ÞÞ:
We establish below that the equation
fðuÞ ¼ 0
has a unique solution on ½pˆ; pˇ
; u˜: Hence ðu˜; w˜; *aÞ; where
w˜ ¼ Dðu˜Þ ðn 1Þqˆ1
and
*a ¼ D0ðu˜Þ þ qˆ1
u˜ C0ðqˆ1Þ
is the unique solution to the system EðaÞ for v ¼ qˆ1: Moreover, u˜Xpˆ (because
fðpˆÞX0 and f0o0). Further w˜40; and *aX0: To see this note that u˜Xpˆ and qˆ1Xqˆi
for i41 imply
qˆn ¼DðpˆÞ qˆ1
Xn1
i 2
qˆi
XDðu˜Þ ðn 1Þqˆ1 ¼ w˜:
And since C is increasing, we have u˜ C0ðw˜ÞXpˆ C0ðqˆnÞX0; and therefore
w˜ ¼ D0ðu˜Þðu˜ C0ðw˜ÞÞ40:
Now, because C0 is increasing, qˆ1XqˆnXw˜ implies
*a ¼ D0ðu˜Þ þ qˆ1
u˜ C0ðqˆ1Þ ¼
qˆ1
u˜ C0ðqˆ1Þ
w˜
u˜ C0ðw˜ÞX
qˆ1 w˜
u˜ C 0ðw˜ÞX0:
Moreover, it is easy to see that if qˆ1 ¼ qˆn ¼ w˜ then qˆ1 ¼? ¼ qˆn ¼ %q and pˆ ¼ u˜ ¼ %p;
which contradicts that pˆa %p: Thus qˆ14w˜ and therefore *a40:
Let s be a profile of supply functions satisfying for iAN\fng; s˜iðpÞ ¼ qˆ1 for
pA½0; r
; and s˜nðu˜Þ ¼ w˜; s˜0nðu˜Þ ¼ *a: The above construction implies s˜ASFE*aðD; C; NÞ:
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Moreover, pðs˜Þ ¼ u˜ ¼ uð*aÞXpˆ ¼ pðsˆÞ; and
p1ðs˜Þ ¼ pðs˜Þs˜1ðpðs˜ÞÞ Cðs˜1ðpðs˜ÞÞÞ ¼ pðs˜Þqˆ1 Cðqˆ1ÞXpˆqˆ1 Cðqˆ1Þ ¼ p1ðsˆÞ;
which establishes the conclusion of Proposition 3.3.
It remains to be shown that fðuÞ ¼ 0 has a unique solution on ½pˆ; pˇ
: Since pˇ4pˆ;
0opˆ C0ðqˆ1Þopˇ C0ð0Þ; and therefore
fðpˇÞ ¼DðpˇÞ ðn 1Þqˆ1 þ D0ðpˇÞðpˇ C0ðDðpˇÞ ðn 1Þqˆ1ÞÞ
¼D0ðpˇÞðpˇ C0ð0ÞÞo0:
We show that fðpˆÞX0: Denote qˆ ¼ DðpˆÞ ðn 1Þqˆ1: Then we have
fðpˆÞ ¼DðpˆÞ ðn 1Þqˆ1 þ D0ðpˆÞðpˆ C0ðqˆÞÞ
¼ ðn 1Þ#a1ðpˆ C0ðqˆ1ÞÞ þ
X
i41
AˆiðC0ðqˆ1Þ C0ðqˆiÞÞ
D0ðpˆÞ C0ðqˆÞ C0ðqˆ1Þ þ ðn 1ÞC0ðqˆ1Þ
X
i41
C0ðqˆiÞ
 !
:
As noted above pˆXC0ðqˆ1Þ; moreover, because C is a convex function and qˆ1Xqˆi; we
have C0ðqˆ1ÞXC0ðqˆiÞ for i41: Hence the first term in the above expression is non
negative; i.e.,
ðn 1Þ#a1ðpˆ C0ðqˆ1ÞÞ þ
X
i41
AˆiðC0ðqˆ1Þ C0ðqˆiÞÞX0:
We show that the second term is also non negative. Since qˆ1Xqˆi for i41; we have
qˆi ¼ DðpˆÞ
P
jai qˆjXDðpˆÞ ðn 1Þqˆ1 ¼ qˆ for i41: Thus, for i41 there is liA½0; 1

such that qˆi ¼ li qˆ1 þ ð1 liÞqˆ: Hence
qˆ þ ðn 1Þqˆ1 ¼ DðpˆÞ ¼ qˆ1 þ
X
i41
qˆi ¼ qˆ1 þ
X
i41
ðliqˆ1 þ ð1 liÞqˆÞ:
Thus,
qˆ1 qˆ ¼ ðqˆ1 qˆÞ
X
i41
ð1 liÞ;
and therefore either
P
i41ð1 liÞ ¼ 1 or qˆ1 ¼ qˆ: This equation together with our
assumption that C000ðqÞX0 for q40; yields the inequality
ðn 1ÞC0ðqˆ1Þ
X
i41
C0ðqˆiÞ ¼ ðn 1ÞC0ðqˆ1Þ
X
i41
C0ðli qˆ1 þ ð1 liÞqˆÞ
X ðn 1ÞC0ðqˆ1Þ
X
i41
liC0ðqˆ1Þ þ
X
i41
ð1 liÞC0ðqˆÞ
¼ ðC0ðqˆ1Þ C0ðqˆÞÞ
X
i41
ð1 liÞ
¼C0ðqˆ1Þ C0ðqˆÞ:
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Hence
D0ðpˆÞ C0ðqˆÞ C0ðqˆ1Þ þ ðn 1ÞC0ðqˆ1Þ
X
i41
C0ðqˆiÞ
 !
X0:
Therefore fðpˆÞX0:
The Intermediate Value Theorem implies that the equation fðuÞ ¼ 0 has a
solution on ½pˆ; pˇ
: Moreover, the solution is unique since f0o0: &
Proof of Lemma 3.8. Let a40: From the definition of p we have
p0ðaÞ ¼ u0ðaÞvðaÞ þ ðuðaÞ C0ðvÞÞ @v
@u
u0ðaÞ þ @v
@a
 
:
From ðEðaÞ:1Þ we have
@w
@u
¼ D
0ðuÞ D00ðuÞðu C0ðwÞÞ
1 C00ðwÞD0ðuÞ 40:
From ðEðaÞ:2Þ we get
@v
@a
¼ ðu C
0ðvÞÞ
1þ C00ðvÞða D0ðuÞÞ40
and
@v
@u
¼ a D
0ðuÞ D00ðuÞðu C0ðvÞÞ
1þ C00ðvÞða D0ðuÞÞ 40:
From ðEðaÞ:3Þ we have
u0ðaÞ ¼ ðn 1Þ
@v
@a
D0ðuÞ ðn 1Þ@v@u @w@u
o0:
Substituting in the expression of p0ðaÞ we have
p0ðaÞ ¼ u0ðaÞ vðaÞ þ ðuðaÞÞ C0ðvðaÞÞ 1
n 1
D0ðuðaÞÞ @w
@u
  
¼ u0ðaÞðuðaÞ C0ðvðaÞÞÞ a D0ðuðaÞÞ þ 1
n 1
D0ðuðaÞÞ @w
@u
  
¼ bðaÞgðaÞ;
where
bðaÞ ¼ u0ðaÞðuðaÞ C0ðvðaÞÞÞ40; ð3:bÞ
and
gðaÞ ¼ a D0ðuðaÞÞ þ 1
n 1
D0ðuðaÞÞ @w
@u
  
¼ 1
n 1
ðn 1Þa ðn 2ÞD0ðuðaÞÞ @w
@u
 
: ð3:gÞ
This establishes the conclusion of Lemma 3.8 under (2).
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Note that
ðn 1Þgð0Þ ¼ ðn 2ÞD0ð %pÞ D
0ð %pÞ þ D00ð %pÞð %p C0ð %qÞÞ
1 C00ð %qÞD0ð %pÞ
¼D0ð %pÞ n 2 D
0ð %pÞ þ D00ð %pÞð %p C0ð %qÞÞ
D0ð %pÞð1 C00ð %qÞD0ð %pÞÞ
 
¼D0ð %pÞðn nÞp0:
We establish Lemma 3.8 under (1) by showing that g0ðaÞo0 for aAð0;NÞ: We have
g0ðaÞ ¼ 1
n 1
ðn 1Þ þ ðn 2ÞD00ðuÞu0ðaÞ þ @
2w
@u2
u0ðaÞ
 
¼ ð1 D00ðuÞu0ðaÞÞ þ 1
n 1
D00ðuÞ þ @
2w
@u2
 
u0ðaÞ:
Since @
2w
@u2
X0 and u0ðaÞo0; we have (recall that D is a concave function)
D00ðuÞ þ @
2w
@u2
 
u0ðaÞp0:
Hence in order to prove that g0ðaÞo0 it suffices to show that 1 D00ðuÞu0ðaÞ40: As
u0ðaÞo0; ðEðaÞ:3Þ implies
0oD0ðuÞu0ðaÞ ¼ ðn 1Þ @v
@u
u0ðaÞ þ v0ðaÞ
 
þ @w
@u
u0ðaÞ:
Since
@w
@u
u0ðaÞo0;
the above inequality implies
@v
@u
u0ðaÞ þ v0ðaÞ40:
Since
v0ðaÞ ¼ ðu C
0ðvÞÞ
1þ C00ðvÞða D0ðuÞÞ40;
we have
@v
@u
u0ðaÞ þ v0ðaÞ ¼ a D
0ðuÞ D00ðuÞðu C0ðvÞÞ
1þ C00ðvÞða D0ðuÞÞ
 
u0ðaÞ þ v0ðaÞ
¼ a D
0ðuÞ
1þ C00ðvÞða D0ðuÞÞ
 
u0ðaÞ þ ð1 D00ðuÞu0ðaÞÞv0ðaÞ40:
The first term in the right hand side of the above expression is negative. Hence the
second term must be positive. Since v0ðaÞ40; we must have 1 D00ðuÞu0ðaÞ40:
Therefore g0ðaÞo0; and since gð0Þp0; we have gðaÞo0 for a40: &
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